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Tribal Immunity from California’s Campaign 
Contribution Disclosure Requirements 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Elections, on both a federal and state level, play a seminal role in 
America’s representative system of government. Elected officials are 
charged by their constituents with the responsibilities of identifying 
and correcting perceived and apparent social, economic, and political 
problems. Because of the powers vested in these representatives, 
millions of dollars from candidates’ personal fortunes and from the 
wallets of campaign supporters are invested each election.1
Native American tribes and their tribal gaming interests are 
playing an increasing role in America’s political process. On both a 
federal and state level, tribes and their affiliate gaming interests have 
made large contributions to political candidates to influence the 
debate on issues ranging from gambling licenses to tribal lands.2 As 
with other campaign contributors, as the size of tribal contributions 
increases, so too does the concern over the influence tribes may be 
exerting on the electoral process. 
This concern has reached a crescendo in California, which is 
home to more Indians3 than any other state and more Indian tribes 
 1. For example, in the 2000 Presidential election, George W. Bush raised over 
$193,000,000 and Al Gore raised over $132,000,000. See 2000 Presidential Race: Total 
Raised and Spent, at http://www.opensecrets.org/2000elect/index/AllCands.htm (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2004). 
 2. See Dwight Morris, The State of Campaign Finance: It Could Be Worse, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 23, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/campaigns/money/ 
archive/money012398.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2004). For a specific example of tribal 
involvement in federal elections, Indian tribes contributed over $1.5 million to Democratic 
candidates and party committees during the 1996 election cycle. Id. Additionally, the Federal 
Election Commission, which maintains records of all donations to federal candidates of $200 
or more, reported that three tribes ranked in the top 500 soft money contributors in the 2000 
election cycle. Brian Stockes, Tribes Chart New Course in Campaign Finance, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY, Sept. 6, 2000, http://www.indiancountry.com/?672&style=printable (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2004).  
 3. United States Census 2000, The American Indian and Alaska Native Population: 
2000, http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbr01-15.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2004). 
According to the census report, the United States is home to 4,119,301 individuals who are 
either entirely or partially American Indian. Id. at 5. Of those, 627,562 live in California. Id. 
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than any state other than Alaska.4 Over the last few years, tribal 
contributions to candidates for California office have seen a dramatic 
increase.5 Most recently, California tribes provided significant 
contributions to two candidates in the recall election of California’s 
governor.6 It is clear that California tribes will continue to make 
large campaign contributions to candidates they support and thereby 
have an impact on California’s electoral process. 
It is unclear, however, whether tribes must make public 
disclosure of those contributions. California, like many states, has 
enacted campaign disclosure requirements to protect the integrity of 
the state’s electoral process.7 In 1974, California adopted the 
Political Reform Act of 1974 (the “PRA”) to ensure that “receipts 
and expenditures in election campaigns [are] fully and truthfully 
disclosed in order that the voters may be fully informed and 
improper practices may be inhibited.”8 California’s legislation, passed 
in the wake of Watergate when campaign finance reform became a 
major issue, is typical of disclosure requirements and reflects the 
political climate favoring disclosure. However, application of 
California’s disclosure requirements to donations from federally 
recognized Indian tribes was recently tested in two superior court 
cases brought by the California Fair Political Practices Commission 
(FPPC) against two Indian tribes for violation of the State’s 
 4. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 134 (July 12, 2002). 
 5. Max Vanzi, Tribes’ Political, Charitable Causes Get Casino Funds, L.A. TIMES, May 
6, 1996, at A3. For example, tribal contributions to California Democratic candidates 
increased from $33,000 in 1992–93 to more than $2.4 million in 1994–95. Id. While 
California tribes have historically donated most of their money to Democratic candidates, the 
tribes have made donations to Republican candidates as well. See id. As further evidence of 
their involvement in California elections, tribes donated more than $741,000 in 1994 to a 
single candidate running for Attorney General. Id. 
 6. Indian tribes across the State donated more than $3 million in support of 
Democratic candidate Cruz Bustamante. An additional $100,000 of tribal money was donated 
in support of Republican candidate Tom McClintock. The tribes also contributed $2 million 
to an independent expenditure committee. See Don Thompson, Tribes Spreading Money 
Beyond Bustamante to GOP Opponent, MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 18, 2003, 
http://www.kansas.com/mld/mercurynews/news/local/6796522.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 
2004). 
 7. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81000–91015 (2003); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 150-9-
333j (2003); MINN. STAT. § 10A.20 (2003); WIS. STAT. § 11.12 (2003). 
 8. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81002(a). The legislation requiring campaign disclosure is 
known as the Political Reform Act of 1974. 
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campaign disclosure requirements.9 In each case, the tribes filed 
motions to quash service of summons and dismiss the suits on the 
ground that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit 
relieves the tribes from compliance with the campaign disclosure 
requirements.10
The superior court decisions delivered contradictory holdings on 
the question of “whether a state court has the power to exercise 
jurisdiction over a sovereign, federally recognized Indian tribe in an 
action brought by a state agency seeking to enforce state law 
concerning election campaign disclosures.”11 In Fair Political 
Practices Commission v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, the 
court concluded “that the tribe is not immune from . . . the PRA 
reporting requirements for its political contributions and legislative 
lobbying activities” because case law does not support the position 
“that a tribe is immune from suit for activities that . . . are intended 
to influence a sovereign State’s electoral and legislative processes.”12 
Two months later, a different superior court in Fair Political 
Practices Commission v. Santa Rosa Indian Community of the Santa 
Rosa Rancheria granted the tribe’s motion to quash, finding that 
case law supports a general tribal immunity “whenever Congress has 
not expressly abrogated the immunity or the tribe has not expressly 
waived its immunity from suit with respect to those activities.”13 The 
California Supreme Court has ordered an appeals court to consider 
whether Indian tribes must abide by the state campaign disclosure 
requirements.14 But while this question is being addressed in 
 9. Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No. 
02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003), aff’d, Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Ct. App. 2004), available at 2004 
WL 389462; Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Santa Rosa Indian Cmty. of the Santa Rosa 
Rancheria, No. 02AS04544, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2003), 
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/Santa%20Rosa%20Quash%20Ruling.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 
2004).  
 10. These doctrines will be developed in full infra Part II. Briefly, the doctrine of tribal 
sovereignty suggests that registered tribes have governmental independence and are free from 
state intrusion on this sovereignty. Tribal immunity from suit suggests that tribes are not 
subject to suit in state courts unless the tribe or the federal government has waived this 
immunity. 
 11. Agua Caliente, 2003 WL 733094, at *1. 
 12. Id. at *5. 
 13. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op. at 9. 
 14. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 2003 
Cal. LEXIS 5367, at *1 (Cal. July 23, 2003). During the publication process of this 
REE-FIN 7/3/2004 2:11 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Summer 2004 
796 
 
California state court, the impact of the court’s ultimate decision is 
not isolated to California’s campaign disclosure requirements. 
Representatives from the election enforcement committees of several 
states joined the FPPC in its argument, recognizing that the impact 
of this question in California will likely impact similar questions in 
their own states.15
This Comment argues that proper application of the United 
States Supreme Court’s tribal immunity doctrine indicates that 
registered tribes are immune from suit by state election officials 
seeking to enforce campaign disclosure requirements unless or until 
the federal government expressly removes the immunity or the tribes 
expressly waive it. While states may have a substantial interest in 
ensuring that their elections are free from the influence of 
anonymous donors,16 that interest does not overcome the federally 
recognized doctrine of tribal immunity that was recognized as 
inherent in the tribes in early Supreme Court jurisprudence.17  
Part II of this Comment introduces the doctrines of tribal 
sovereignty and tribal immunity from suit, providing an explanation 
of their origins and their current status. Part II also provides an 
introduction to the PRA and its subsequent disclosure 
requirements.18 Part III discusses the cases recently reviewed in 
California superior court and their holdings. Part IV addresses the 
Comment, the appellate court denied the Tribe’s petition by a 2–1 vote. The court ultimately 
concluded that the doctrine of tribal immunity has no basis in the Constitution and is therefore 
trumped by the rights of states to protect their republican form of government. Agua Caliente, 
10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 682. The dissent, however, concluded that the doctrine of tribal immunity 
“is anchored in the United States Constitution.” Id. at 693. Consequently, the dissent argued 
that the two competing constitutional provisions should be “harmonized so as to give effect to 
both to the extent possible.” Id. at 694 (citing City and County of San Francisco v. County of 
Mateo, 896 P.2d 181, 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)). Under this rationale, the dissent suggested 
that a proper solution would recognize tribal immunity from the FPPC’s action because 
protecting the doctrine in this situation would not destroy the State’s right to regulate its 
electoral processes in light of “viable alternatives” available to the State. Id. The Tribe has yet 
to decide whether to appeal this decision to the California Supreme Court. Steve Wiegand, 
Court: No Tribal Immunity to FPPC, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 4, 2004, at A3. 
 15. Representatives from the election boards in Minnesota, Connecticut, and Wisconsin 
filed declarations in the Agua Caliente case to oppose the Tribe’s motion to quash service. See 
Opposition to Motion to Quash, at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/index.html?id=385 (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2004).  
 16. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
 17. A review of the Supreme Court’s tribal immunity jurisprudence is included infra 
Part II. 
 18. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 81000–91015 (2003).  
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question of whether a federally recognized Indian tribe is immune 
from suits brought by state agencies to enforce campaign disclosure 
requirements. Specifically, Part IV analyzes whether the lack of a 
specific federal law providing immunity from suit to tribes for their 
activities in state electoral processes forecloses the doctrine of tribal 
immunity, and whether the Tenth Amendment and Guarantee 
Clause serve as an explicit waiver by the federal government to tribal 
immunity from suit for participation in state elections. While 
concluding that tribal immunity precludes suit against tribes for their 
failure to comply with disclosure requirements, Part IV also identifies 
how the purposes of the disclosure requirements can still be met 
while recognizing tribal immunity. Part V provides a brief 
conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty 
1. The development of tribal sovereignty 
Traditional notions of tribal sovereignty in the United States date 
to early decisions of the Supreme Court concerning whether tribes 
possessed the ability to transfer title to property after the 
establishment of authority and laws in the United States.19 In Johnson 
v. McIntosh, Chief Justice Marshall noted that while the tribes 
retained some rights to sovereignty after discovery, the establishment 
of law and exercise of authority in the Americas led to a necessary 
impairment of the historic tribal rights in land.20 Thus, while 
 19. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). Some scholarship also suggests that 
the notion of tribal sovereignty predates even the Constitution. See, e.g., Robert Clinton, There 
is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 118–48 (2002). 
 20. 21 U.S. at 574. Early treatment in the Court of the native tribes was based largely 
on the European principle of discovery. This principle allowed the discoverer to “assert[] the 
ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claim[] and exercise[], as a consequence of this 
ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives.” Id. Chief 
Justice Marshall concluded that while the tribes were the “rightful occupants of the soil . . . 
their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished” by 
discovery. Id. Thus, while Chief Justice Marshall recognized the tribes as sovereigns, they were 
not recognized as “complete” sovereigns, suggesting that the tribes were ultimately subject to 
the federal government. See also McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 
173 (1973). 
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Marshall characterized the tribes as sovereigns in Johnson v. McIntosh, 
that characterization was left unclear by his suggestion that the 
tribes’ sovereignty was incomplete.21
The Court added definition to its characterization of the tribes as 
sovereigns ten years later in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,22 in which 
the Court examined the “condition of the Indians in relation to the 
United States.”23 In defining their relationship to the United States, 
the tribes characterized themselves as foreign nations owing no 
allegiance to the United States.24 The Court, however, rejected this 
characterization for several reasons. First, because the tribes were 
“within the jurisdictional limits of the United States,” the Court held 
it would not be proper to characterize them as foreign.25 Second, the 
treaties between the tribes and the United States placed the tribes 
under the protection of the United States.26 Finally, the tribes 
admitted that “the United States [has] the sole and exclusive right of 
regulating the trade with them, and managing all their affairs as they 
think proper.”27 Thus, instead of characterizing the tribes as foreign 
nations, the Court instead characterized the tribes as “domestic 
dependent nations.”28 This characterization enforced the notion of 
tribes as “distinct political societ[ies], separated from others, capable 
of managing [their] own affairs and governing [themselves],” while 
still recognizing that the tribes were not nations independent from 
the United States and its laws.29
In a further explanation of the relationship between the tribes 
and the United States, Chief Justice Marshall noted in Worcester v. 
 21. See supra note 20. 
 22. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 23. Id. at 16. The Court characterized this relationship as “unlike that of any other two 
people in existence” and as “marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where 
else.” Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 17. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. Marshall went on to explain that the characterization implied that the tribes 
“occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will . . . . [T]hey are in a 
state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.” 
Id. Though not explicitly defining the term “dependent,” Marshall gives the term meaning by 
recognizing that “[t]hey look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its 
power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father.” Id. 
 29. Id. 
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Georgia30 that the combined acts of the United States government 
“consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, 
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, 
and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is 
not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.”31 
This explanation expanded the notion of tribes as domestic 
dependent nations by providing that tribes possess some level of 
exclusive authority within their tribal boundaries.32
This recognition of exclusive authority included a separation 
between tribes and the states. Marshall noted that “[t]he treaties and 
laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as 
completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all 
intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the 
government of the Union.”33 This separation of tribes from the 
states was grounded largely in the language of Article I of the 
Constitution, which gives Congress authority to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.”34 The Court reasoned that this language 
 30. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1831). 
 31. Id. at 557 (emphasis added). Marshall reemphasized the Court’s recognition of 
tribal authority in noting that “[t]he Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, 
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed 
possessors of the soil.” Id. at 559. That he should use the characterization “independent” so 
soon after his characterization of the tribes as “domestic dependent nations” in Cherokee Nation 
suggests a further recognition of tribal sovereignty and a weakening of the term “dependent.” 
 32. It is important to recognize that this exclusive authority was only extended by the 
Court to cover activities on territorial boundaries. The implicit corollary is that tribes do not 
possess exclusive authority over tribal conduct occurring off territorial boundaries. This 
distinction will be discussed infra note 59. It is also important to recognize that this exclusive 
authority can be diminished by Congress under Article I of the Constitution. See infra note 
34.  
 33. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557. 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Court compares the language in Article I with 
the language of the Articles of Confederation, which suggested that states possessed some 
authority to regulate tribal conduct. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 558. Under the Articles of 
Confederation, Congress was given the authority to “regulat[e] the trade and manag[e] all the 
affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the states.” Id. at 558–59. This authority, 
however, was subject to the limitation “that the legislative power of any state within its own 
limits be not infringed or violated.” Id. at 559. This caveat to Congress’s authority to regulate 
tribal conduct provided the suggestion that the Articles of Confederation granted to states 
some authority to regulate tribal conduct within state boundaries. The strength of this 
suggestion, however, is unclear. In Federalist Paper 42, Madison questions the notion that the 
Articles of Confederation granted to states the authority to regulate tribes. THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 42. Madison noted that “how the trade with Indians, though not members of a State, yet 
residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so 
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“comprehend[s] all that is required for the regulation”35 of the 
tribes, and therefore “[t]he whole intercourse between the United 
States and [Indian tribes], is, by our constitution and laws, vested in 
the government of the United States.”36 This separation of tribes 
from the states was used by the Court to shield tribes from attempts 
by state legislatures to regulate conduct within tribal boundaries.37
2. The modern doctrine of tribal sovereignty as it relates to nonmembers 
on Indian land 
Since Worcester, federal case law has chipped away at the notion 
that tribal sovereign immunity serves as a complete prohibition to 
the exercise of jurisdiction by states over tribes and conduct on tribal 
land.38 In 1973, the Court recognized that “the doctrine [of tribal 
sovereignty] has undergone considerable evolution in response to 
changed circumstances.”39 The Court explained this evolution by 
far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible.” Id. Madison 
continued by noting that this was “not the only case in which the articles of confederation . . . 
inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in 
the Union, with compleat sovereignty in the States.” Id. 
 35. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559. 
 36. Id. at 561. This does not suggest that states possess no ability to regulate tribes. For 
example, states still possess the authority to regulate all intrastate commerce.  
 37. Worcester involved legislation passed in 1830 by the Georgia Legislature requiring 
all white individuals living within the Cherokee nation to obtain a permit from the governor 
and take an oath to support and defend the Georgia Constitution. Id. at 523. Mr. Worcester, a 
white missionary from Vermont, was sentenced to four years in the state penitentiary for 
violating this provision, and brought suit to challenge the validity of the state statute. Id. at 
562. The Court ultimately concluded that the Georgia act was unconstitutional and that the 
State had no authority to regulate conduct within tribal boundaries. Id. at 561 (“The 
Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries 
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of 
Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in 
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.”). 
 38. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 
(1991) (states are free to collect taxes on sales to nonmembers); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 
(1983) (state can require traders who operate on reservations to obtain a state liquor license to 
sell liquor for off-premises consumption); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville 
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (states may impose cigarette and sales taxes on on-
reservation purchases by nonmembers of the tribe); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai 
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (states can require Indian retailer on 
reservations to add cigarette tax to non-Indian sales); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 
(1896) (state law may be used to try to punish crimes committed on an Indian reservation by 
or against non-Indians); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882) (state law can be 
applied to crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indians on Indian land).  
 39. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973). 
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suggesting that “notions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to 
take account of the State’s legitimate [business] interests in 
regulating the affairs of non-Indians.”40 This adjustment resulted in 
the Court granting states some rights over the nonmembers on 
Indian land so long as the state did not “infringe[] on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”41
Instead of treating tribal sovereignty as an absolute bar to state 
jurisdiction over any conduct occurring on the reservation and any 
conduct of Indians off the reservation, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
noted that the “trend has been away from the idea of inherent 
Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance 
on federal preemption.”42 The trend towards preemption allowed the 
doctrine of tribal sovereignty to remain a “relevant” doctrine so long 
as it was used to “provide[] a backdrop against which the applicable 
treaties and federal statutes must be read.”43 Preemption analysis, 
however, meant that the doctrine was not relevant to provide 
“definitive resolution” on questions of state jurisdiction.44 The 
Court’s characterization of tribal sovereignty as merely a backdrop 
against which treaties are considered has “alter[ed] the presumption 
that the tribe has governmental power over all matters affecting the 
tribe on the reservation, and that the state does not.”45
The doctrine of federal preemption, as currently recognized by 
the Court, indicates that “State jurisdiction is preempted by the 
operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal 
and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests 
 40. Id.; see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 
326 U.S. 496 (1946). By “non-Indians,” the Court was referring to changes in the doctrine of 
tribal sovereignty that allowed state courts to hear both suits by Indians against non-Indians as 
well as suits by non-Indians against non-Indians for crimes committed while on the 
reservation. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 220. 
 41. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 (citing Williams, 358 U.S. at 219–20); see also 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973). 
 42. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172. Marshall evidenced this trend by noting that 
“modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to 
look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power.” Id. 
 43. Id.; see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980) 
(noting that determination does not depend “on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state 
or tribal sovereignty, but [calls] for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, 
and tribal interests at stake”). 
 44. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172. 
 45. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 75 (West 2d ed. 1988). 
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at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.”46 
Thus, under a preemption analysis, state law may preempt tribal 
interest in self-government if the state can demonstrate that its 
interest outweighs the tribe’s interest in self-government.47 Even 
with respect to nonmembers on Indian land, this is not an easy 
balancing test for states to win.48 The preemption analysis, then, 
operates to provide states with jurisdiction over nonmembers on 
Indian land only when the state can demonstrate a substantial 
interest in regulating conduct on Indian land and only if that interest 
outweighs the tribe’s interest in self-government.49
3. Determining when states are authorized to regulate tribes and tribal 
members 
The federal preemption analysis, which the Supreme Court has 
used to determine those situations in which states are authorized to 
regulate non-Indians on Indian land, has not been used to determine 
when states are authorized to regulate tribes themselves and tribal 
 46. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983); see also 
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145; Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962). 
 47. See CANBY, supra note 45, at 76. Importantly, the Court noted in a footnote to 
Mescalero that “[t]he exercise of state authority may also be barred by an independent barrier—
inherent tribal sovereignty—if it ‘unlawfully infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to 
make their own laws and be ruled by them.’” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 
U.S. 324, 334 n.16 (1983) (quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142) (citation omitted). But 
because tribal self-government is not generously defined “to include anything that affects 
Indian interests . . . most cases involving the application of state law in Indian country are 
decided on preemption grounds.” CANBY, supra note 45, at 76. 
 48. For an example of the difficulty states have in winning this balancing test, see New 
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache 
Tribe, the State attempted to enforce its hunting and fishing regulations against non-Indians 
who obtained permission to hunt and fish on the reservation. Id. at 329. The Supreme Court 
upheld a decision by the Tenth Circuit that did not allow the State to preempt tribal 
regulations governing hunting laws for non-Indians on the reservation. Id. at 330. The Court 
noted that the “[d]evelopment of the reservation’s fish and wildlife resources has involved a 
sustained, cooperative effort by the Tribe and the Federal Government.” Id. at 327–28. This 
relationship with the federal government and the subsequent development of wildlife 
resources, the Court reasoned, provided a significant benefit to the Tribe by providing the 
resources needed to “maintain the Tribal government and provide services to Tribe members.” 
Id. at 327. The Court ultimately concluded that granting jurisdiction to the State “would 
effectively nullify the Tribe’s unquestioned authority to regulate the use of its resources . . . , 
interfere with the comprehensive tribal regulatory scheme, and threaten Congress’ firm 
commitment to the encouragement of tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.” Id. 
at 344. 
 49. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
REE-FIN 7/3/2004 2:11 PM 
793] Tribal Immunity from Campaign Contribution Disclosure 
 803 
 
members. Indeed, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to 
minimize tribal authority to regulate its own conduct and the 
conduct of its members, particularly when that conduct occurs on 
the tribe’s land.50
Unlike situations involving the state’s ability to regulate non-
Indians on Indian land, the Court has not adopted a balancing test 
to determine those situations in which states are empowered to 
regulate tribes and tribal members. Instead, the Court reviews state 
attempts to regulate tribal conduct under more traditional notions of 
tribal sovereignty.51 With these traditional notions serving as the 
measuring stick, those situations in which states have been granted 
authority to regulate tribes themselves are rare, especially when states 
are attempting to regulate tribes and their members on reservation 
land. Indeed, the Court has stated that only under “exceptional 
circumstances [may] a State . . . assert jurisdiction over the on-
reservation activities of tribal members.”52 And while noting that 
exceptional circumstances exist in which states may regulate conduct 
of tribes or tribal members on reservations, the Court has provided 
no suggestion of the circumstances which would allow states to 
satisfy this test.53
Thus, under the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, tribes and tribal 
members enjoy a general immunity from state regulation for on-
reservation conduct, unless a state can satisfy the “exceptional 
circumstances” test.54 For example, with respect to state attempts to 
 50. The Court characterized the instances in which it granted to states the authority to 
regulate tribes in the absence of congressional authorization of such authority as “few.” 
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 74 (1962). 
 51. See id. at 74–75.  
 52. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 (1987) 
(emphasis added) (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331–32 
(1983)). 
 53. The Court in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe cites to Puyallup Tribe Inc. v. 
Dept. of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977), as an example of an exceptional 
circumstance in which a state was allowed to regulate the on-reservation activities of tribal 
members. 462 U.S. at 331–32 & n.15. In Puyallup Tribe, the State of Washington was 
allowed to regulate on-reservation fishing by tribal members. 433 U.S. at 165. The facts of this 
case were deemed exceptional for two reasons. First, the land at issue, while located within the 
reservation boundaries, did not belong to the Tribe. Id. at 175. Second, the Court held that 
the State had an interest in conserving the wildlife, which had become a scare resource. Id. at 
175–77. 
 54. Tribal immunity from regulation should not be confused with tribal immunity from 
suit. Tribal immunity from suit will be discussed infra Part II.B. 
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tax reservation land or Indian income generated from activities 
carried on within the reservation, the Court has held that “Indian 
tribes, like the Federal Government itself, are exempt from direct 
state taxation and that this exemption is ‘lifted only when Congress 
has made its intention to do so unmistakably clear.’”55 As a result, 
tribes are immune from state attempts to regulate income from on-
reservation property or income-generating activities.56
While the Court has been unwilling to grant a general 
presumption that all “on-reservation activities involving a resident 
tribe are . . . beyond the reach of state law”57 the Court has 
“consistently admonished that federal statutes and regulations must 
be ‘construed generously in order to comport with . . . traditional 
notions of [Indian] sovereignty and with the federal policy of 
encouraging tribal independence.’”58 The Court, however, has been 
more willing to grant to states the right to regulate the conduct of 
tribes or their members when that conduct occurs off the 
reservation.59 For example, the Court in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones held that the State of New Mexico was authorized to impose a 
tax on sales receipts the Tribe earned from its operation of a ski-
resort on off-reservation land leased from the federal government.60 
In reaching its decision, the Court noted that “[a]bsent express 
federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation 
boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory 
 55. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 183 n.14 (1989) (citing 
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985)); see also McClanahan v. State Tax 
Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1962). 
 56. Compare with Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe of Oklahoma, where the Supreme Court held that the Tax Commission was not entitled 
to tax on-reservation sales of cigarettes to tribal members but was entitled to tax the on-
reservation sales to nonmembers. 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
 57. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 845 
(1982). 
 58. Id. at 846 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 
(1980)). The preemption analysis is essentially a fact-specific inquiry in which the Court weighs 
the competing state interest against the tribe’s interests in self-government. While no 
presumption exists in favor of the tribe’s interest in self-government, the Court’s language 
suggests that the scales might be tipped initially in favor of the tribes, thus requiring the states 
to demonstrate compelling reasons for tipping the scales in favor of state jurisdiction. 
 59. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (“State authority 
over Indians is yet more extensive over activities . . . not on any reservation.” (citing Organized 
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962))). 
 60. Id. at 155. 
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state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State.”61 As a 
result, traditional notions of tribal sovereignty as a bar to immunity 
from state regulation have been weakened when the conduct at 
question takes place off-reservation. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, then, suggests that for the PRA to 
apply to California tribes, the court must determine whether the 
tribal conduct (campaign donations) occurred on or off the 
reservation. If the conduct occurred off-reservation, the state will 
likely be required to demonstrate that the requirements are 
applicable to all state citizens. If the conduct occurred on-
reservation, the state will likely be required to satisfy the “exceptional 
circumstances” test. 
B. Tribal Immunity from Suit 
Even if a court were to determine under either a preemption 
analysis or under the “exceptional circumstances” test that states are 
authorized to regulate tribal conduct, states may still be helpless to 
enforce their applicable regulations. Under the doctrine of tribal 
immunity, tribes enjoy common law immunity from suit by states.62 
This protection was recognized by the courts as a natural extension 
of the powers vested in a sovereign and “necessary to protect nascent 
tribal governments from encroachments by States.”63
Unlike immunity from regulation, tribal immunity from suit 
extends to tribal activities taking place both on and off the 
reservation.64 Additionally, the scope of conduct covered by the 
immunity has been extended to areas not relating directly to tribal 
 61. Id. at 148–49; see also, e.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 
392 (1968). 
 62. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) (“[T]ribal 
immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the States.”); Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“Indian tribes have long been recognized 
as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign 
powers.”); Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 172 (“Absent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled 
that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe.”); United States 
v. United States Fid. & Guar., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (“Indian Nations are exempt from 
suit without congressional authorization.”); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 
(1919) (“Without authorization from Congress, the Nation could not then have been sued in 
any court; at least without its consent.”).  
 63. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758. While the doctrine is generally recognized as an outgrowth 
of traditional notions of sovereignty, the Supreme Court recently stated that the “doctrine 
developed almost by accident.” Id. at 756. 
 64. Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 168 (1977). 
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self-government, such as off-reservation commercial conduct or 
noncompliance with state and local laws.65
In fact, the Court recently recognized tribal immunity from suit 
where state laws were validly imposed against tribes. In Kiowa Tribe 
of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., Manufacturing 
Technologies sought damages for the Tribe’s default on a contract 
entered into off-reservation.66 Because the contract was entered into 
outside the reservation, the Tribe was not immune from application 
of the state contract laws under the canon of cases that provides for 
the application of state substantive law to a tribe’s commercial 
activities occurring off-reservation.67 But while the Tribe was subject 
to the requirements of the state substantive law, the Court 
recognized that the Tribe was immune from enforcement actions 
under the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit.68 The Court held 
that “[t]ribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether those 
contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether 
they were made on or off a reservation. Congress has not abrogated 
this immunity, nor has petitioner waived it, so the immunity governs 
this case.”69 Thus, while the Court has refused to extend tribal 
immunity from regulation in many situations to tribal conduct 
occurring off-reservation,70 tribal immunity from suit extends to 
cover conduct occurring both on- and off-reservation. 
Under the doctrine of tribal immunity, “a tribe is subject to suit 
only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived 
its immunity.”71 Thus, unless Congress has abrogated immunity, or 
the tribe has waived it, the doctrine of tribal immunity prevents state 
enforcement actions against tribes, even if the state is authorized to 
 65. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755; Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi 
Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
 66. 523 U.S. at 752. 
 67. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1973); Organized 
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962). 
 68. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755 (“To say substantive state laws apply to off-reservation 
conduct . . . is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit. . . . There is a 
difference between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available to 
enforce them.” (citing Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514)). 
 69. Id. at 760; see also Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514 (holding that while the state had 
authority to tax cigarette sales to nonmembers on the reservation, the tribe was immune from 
suit by the state to collect unpaid taxes). 
 70. See supra notes 64–67. 
 71. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 751; see also Three Affiliated Tribes of Forth Berthold 
Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986). 
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regulate the tribe. Moreover, courts require that any tribal waiver be 
explicit, and will not imply any waiver from a tribe’s conduct.72 For 
example, the Supreme Court recently determined that a tribe that 
filed a civil action had not waived its immunity from counterclaims 
arising out of the same scenario.73
Similarly, congressional abrogation must also be explicit.74 In 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, a female member of the Santa Clara 
Pueblo Tribe brought an action claiming that an ordinance denying 
tribal membership to children of female members who do not marry 
within the Tribe, while at the same time extending tribal 
membership to children of male members who marry outside the 
Tribe, violated the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1986 (ICRA).75 
Martinez claimed that the ordinance violated a provision in the 
ICRA which made it unlawful for tribes to “deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.”76 The Tribe 
asserted immunity from suit. Though the Court recognized that 
Congress theoretically had the power to abrogate tribal immunity in 
cases arising under the ICRA, because the Court found no explicit 
language to that effect, it concluded that tribal immunity from suit 
still existed in these cases.77
While a tribe’s ability to both file suit and rely on the doctrine of 
immunity to protect itself against suits arising out of the same 
scenario may seem inequitable, Congress and the courts have been 
unwilling to provide many loopholes to the broad purview of tribal 
immunity from suit. Though the Court has recognized “reasons to 
doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine,” and has hinted that 
it might “need to abrogate tribal immunity, at least as an overarching 
 72. See C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 
U.S. 411, 418 (2001) (“[T]o relinquish its immunity, a tribe’s waiver must be ‘clear.’” 
(citations omitted)); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (holding that 
sovereign immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed”). 
 73. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 509. 
 74. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“This aspect of tribal 
sovereignty [common-law immunity from suit] . . . is subject to the superior and plenary 
control of Congress.”). 
 75. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2000). 
 76. Id. § 1302(8). 
 77. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59 (“In the absence here of any unequivocal expression of 
contrary legislative intent, we conclude that suits against the tribe under the ICRA are barred 
by its sovereign immunity from suit.”). 
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rule,”78 it has yet to provide any general exceptions to the traditional 
understanding of tribal immunity from suit and has continued with 
its general application of the doctrine.79 The Court has been 
unwilling to base decisions on competing policy considerations, 
preferring instead to leave that debate to Congress.80
Thus, even if tribal immunity from regulation does not shield 
tribes from compliance with the requirements of the PRA, California 
will be unable to enforce those requirements in state court unless 
either the tribe or Congress has expressly abrogated tribal immunity 
from suit in this situation. 
C. The Political Reform Act of 1974 
The Political Reform Act of 1974 was adopted to ensure that 
public officials serve in an “impartial manner, free from bias caused 
by their own financial interests or the financial interests of persons 
who have supported them.”81 Because the legislature determined 
that the then-existing disclosure requirements increased the influence 
of large campaign contributors, new disclosure requirements were 
adopted.82 The Act identifies the following as its purposes: 
(a) Receipts and expenditures in election campaigns should be fully 
and truthfully disclosed in order that the voters may be fully 
informed and improper practices may be inhibited. 
(b) The activities of lobbyists should be regulated and their finances 
disclosed in order that improper influences will not be directed at 
public officials. 
 78. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 759. The competing policy considerations the Court appears to be 
contemplating are those of maintaining tribal independence and of protecting those who deal 
with tribes. While Congress and the Court have granted tribes immunity from suit to protect 
tribal rights of independence, the Court suggests that in an “interdependent and mobile 
society . . . tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-
governance.” Id. at 758. 
 81. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81001(b) (2003). 
 82. Id. § 81001(d); see also Governor Gray Davis Comm. v. Am. Taxpayers Alliance, 
125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“The manifest purpose of the financial 
disclosure provisions of the Act is to insure a better informed electorate and to prevent 
corruption of the political process.”). 
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(c) Assets and income of public officials which may be materially 
affected by their official actions should be disclosed . . . .83
The Act is essentially a reporting act, requiring both candidates 
and contributors to report contributions made and received. With 
respect to contributors, the Act requires that “committees” make 
disclosures of their campaign contributions.84 Committees are 
defined by statute as “any person or combination of persons who 
directly . . . makes contributions totaling ten thousand dollars 
($10,000) or more in a calendar year to or at the behest of 
candidates or committees.”85 Each committee is required 
semiannually to submit reports called campaign statements if they 
have made contributions or independent expenditures during the 
six-month period before the date on which the report must be 
filed.86
On the campaign statement, committees are required to disclose 
every contribution or independent expenditure made during the 
period equaling one hundred dollars ($100) or more.87 This report 
must provide the name of the candidate, the candidate’s address, the 
amount of the contribution, the date on which the contribution was 
provided, the cumulative amount of contributions made to the 
 83. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81002(a)–(c). This section explicitly identifies four additional 
purposes that are not relevant to the scope of this Comment. 
 84. Id. § 84211. 
 85. Id. § 82013(c). The Act defines the term “person” to include any “individual, 
proprietorship, firm, partnership, joint venture, syndicate, business trust, company, 
corporation, limited liability company, association, committee, and any other organization or 
group of persons acting in concert.” Id. § 82047. The term does not specifically mention 
Indian tribes or any other distinct political entities. If an Indian tribe were to fit within this 
definition, it would likely do so as an organization or group acting in concert. The FPPC 
asserted in its complaint that tribes satisfy the Act’s definition of person. Plaintiff’s Second 
Amended Complaint ¶ 9, Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla 
Indians, 2003 WL 733094 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003) (No. 02AS04545), at 
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/acl/AguaCalSAC2.pdf. The issue of whether tribes fit within 
this definition, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment, which focuses on the first 
question that would arise in similar cases, i.e., whether the doctrine of tribal immunity prevents 
the state from enforcing such legislation in a lawsuit. 
 86. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84200(a)–(b). The terms “contributions” and “independent 
expenditures” are defined terms within the Act. See id. §§ 82015, 82031. The question of 
whether the contributions made in these cases satisfy either of these definitions is a question of 
fact which is not essential to the thesis of this Comment. 
 87. Id. § 84211(k). 
REE-FIN 7/3/2004 2:11 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Summer 2004 
810 
 
candidate, and the office and district for which the candidate seeks 
nomination or election.88
The Act also imposes reporting requirements for lobbying 
expenses. Any person who makes direct or indirect payments of 
$5,000 or more in a calendar quarter “to influence legislative or 
administrative action” must file periodic reports.89 This report must 
contain the name of the lobbyist employed by the filer, the total 
amount paid to each lobbying firm, the total amount of all payments 
to lobbyists employed by the filer, and a description of the specific 
lobbying interests of the filer.90
Regulation of the Act falls to the FPPC, which has “primary 
responsibility for the impartial, effective administration and 
implementation of this title.”91 The FPPC’s broad mandate includes 
the power to investigate possible violations of the Act and to hold 
hearings to determine if violations have occurred.92 It is under this 
authority that the Agua Caliente and Santa Rosa Community cases 
arose. 
III. CALIFORNIA CASES TESTING THE APPLICABILITY OF TRIBAL 
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT UNDER THE PRA 
A. Fair Political Practices Commission v. Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians93
1. The facts 
In October of 2002, the FPPC brought suit against the Agua 
Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians (hereinafter “Agua Caliente”)94 
for violation of the Political Reform Act’s campaign disclosure and 
 88. Id. § 84211(k)(1)–(5). 
 89. Id. § 86115(b). 
 90. Id. § 86116(a)–(d). 
 91. Id. § 83111. 
 92. Id. §§ 83115, 83116. 
 93. No. 02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003), aff’d, Agua 
Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Ct. App. 2004), 
available at 2004 WL 389462.  
 94. The Agua Caliente Tribe resides on approximately 30,000 acres in the Palm Springs 
area. The bylaws and constitution of the Tribe were adopted in 1952 and approved by the 
Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, in the same year. See Political History, at 
http:/www.aguacaliente.org/political.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). 
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lobbying disclosure requirements. The FPPC claimed that the Tribe 
made sizable contributions in 1998, 2001, and 2002 without 
disclosing the contributions.95 The size of the contributions qualified 
the Tribe as a major donor committee required to file semiannual 
reports detailing all political contributions.96 The Tribe, however, 
filed no reports with the FPPC and furthermore, according to the 
FPPC, did not report funds paid to a lobbying firm contracted to 
influence legislative actions.97 Representatives from the election 
enforcement committees of several states joined with the FPPC in 
arguing that states possess the ability to both regulate and enforce 
campaign disclosure requirements on tribes living within the state’s 
jurisdiction.98
The Tribe responded by bringing a motion to quash service of 
summons on the grounds that the court lacked personal jurisdiction 
as a result of tribal immunity.99 The ensuing lawsuit tested “whether 
a state court has the power to exercise jurisdiction over a sovereign, 
federally recognized Indian tribe in an action brought by a state 
agency seeking to enforce state law concerning election campaign 
disclosures.”100
 95. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 10–14, Agua Caliente (No. 
02AS04545), at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/acl/AguaCalSAC2.pdf (last visited May 26, 
2004). The FPPC alleged that the Tribe made contributions totaling at least $7,510,177 in 
1998, $175,250 in 2001, and another $426,000 in 2002. Id. ¶¶ 11–13. The FPPC asserts 
that these contributions went to support statewide ballot initiatives as well as more than 140 
candidates for state offices, such as Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General. Id. 
The suit was brought before the recall election in 2003; thus, any funds donated to candidates 
in that election were not part of this suit. 
 96. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82013. 
 97. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 14, 17–22, Agua Caliente (No. 
02AS04545), at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/acl/AguaCalSAC2.pdf.   
 98. Representatives from Connecticut, Minnesota, and Wisconsin filed declarations 
opposing the Tribe’s motion to quash. See Opposition to Motion to Quash, at 
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/index.html?id=385 (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). The declarations 
filed by these representatives serve as an indication of the importance of these cases. A 
recognition by California courts that tribal contributions are not subject to regulation by the 
State or that tribes are immune from enforcement of such statutes has the potential to impact 
court decisions in nearly every state. 
 99. Agua Caliente, 2003 WL 733094, at *1. 
 100. Id. 
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2. The case in support of removing tribal immunity from suit under the 
PRA 
The superior court ultimately concluded that the doctrine of 
tribal immunity does not shield tribes from suits for failure to 
disclose campaign contributions under the PRA.101 Accordingly, the 
court determined that it had the power to determine whether the 
Tribe was in violation of the Act. 
In reaching its conclusion, the court recognized that neither the 
Tribe nor Congress had expressly abrogated immunity in this 
situation.102 Indeed, the court reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s 
explicit statement that “an effective waiver of tribal immunity from 
suit must be clearly and unequivocally expressed.”103 The court relied 
on this rule to conclude that the Tribe’s voluntary participation in 
the state’s political contests did not serve as an effective waiver of 
tribal immunity from suit.104 The court also rejected the FPPC’s 
contention that tribal immunity from suit has been absolved in any 
situation in which a state seeks to regulate its political processes.105
But while the court recognized the Supreme Court’s holdings 
allowing immunity to be abrogated only upon express waiver, and 
after finding that the Tribe provided no express waiver, the court 
nevertheless concluded that Agua Caliente was “not immune from 
the FPPC’s action to enforce the PRA reporting requirements for its 
political contributions and legislative lobbying activities.”106 Relying 
on the implications in Kiowa that the doctrine should not exist as a 
general rule,107 the court determined that the rule should not apply 
in this situation because “[n]o case has held that a tribe is immune 
from suit for activities that, instead of promoting tribal self-
governance and development, are intended to influence a sovereign 
 101. Id. at *5. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at *4 (citing C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of 
Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 423 (2001)). 
 104. Id. (“Thus, the Tribe’s contributions to political campaigns and employment of 
legislative lobbyists made outside the statutory framework of the PRA, though quite extensive, 
are insufficient by themselves to effectively waive the Tribe’s immunity from the FPPC’s 
enforcement action.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at *5. 
 107. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
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State’s electoral and legislative processes.”108 The court noted further 
that “[no] case suggest[s] that the federal common law of tribal 
immunity was meant to apply to a suit by the State to enforce its 
laws regulating all persons who seek to influence the State’s political 
processes.”109 Based on these perceived gaps in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, the court chose to identify conduct affecting a 
sovereign state’s electoral processes as a situation in which the 
doctrine of immunity from suit does not exist. 
The court supported its conclusion on two grounds. First, the 
court cited the Supreme Court’s holding in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones that off-reservation Indians are, like other citizens, subject to all 
nondiscriminatory laws of the states.110 Under this doctrine the court 
reasoned that the Tribe would be subject to the nondiscriminatory 
PRA because the impact of the regulation reached beyond the 
reservation and did not relate specifically to tribal self-government.111
Second, the court concluded that tribal immunity from suit in 
this situation would violate rights reserved to the State by the 
Constitution. Specifically, the court found that recognizing tribal 
immunity in this situation would “intrude upon the State’s exercise 
of its reserved power under the Tenth Amendment to regulate its 
electoral and legislative processes and would interfere with the 
republican form of government guaranteed to the State.”112 The 
court contended that among the powers reserved to states under the 
Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause was that of controlling 
the influence of wealthy interests in state elections.113 This reasoning 
was supported by reference to Buckley v. Valeo,114 in which the 
Supreme Court upheld federal campaign disclosure laws as an 
important tool in protecting the political process. The court applied 
 108. Agua Caliente, 2003 WL 733094, at *5. The court attempts to distinguish this case 
from other cases in which the Supreme Court refused to abrogate tribal immunity by noting 
that “[p]ertinent decisions recognizing the doctrine have concerned activities affecting tribal 
self-governance and economic development, not activities affecting the governance and 
development of another sovereign.” Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1973)). 
 111. Id. at *5–6.  
 112. Id. at *6. 
 113. Id. 
 114. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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the same reasoning to the PRA and concluded that the Act “must 
apply equally to all with no exceptions.”115
Based on this reasoning, the court held that it was “empowered 
to exercise jurisdiction over the Tribe to decide the important issues 
raised in this case.”116 In July of 2003, however, the California 
Supreme Court ordered an appeals court to reconsider the issue of 
whether tribes are protected by common law immunity.117
B. Fair Political Process Comm’n v. Santa Rosa Community of the 
Santa Rosa Rancheria118
1. The facts 
The FPPC also brought a claim in October 2002 against the 
Santa Rosa Community of the Santa Rosa Rancheria Tribe 
(hereinafter “Santa Rosa”)119 for violations of the PRA. The claim 
alleged that the Tribe contributed at least $125,000 in 1998 and 
$35,000 in 2000 to California political candidates and 
committees.120 As in Agua Caliente, the FPPC argued that the size 
of the contribution qualified Santa Rosa as a committee under the 
PRA and subjected the Tribe to semiannual reporting 
requirements.121
Santa Rosa filed a motion to quash “on the ground that [the] 
court lacks jurisdiction over the Tribe pursuant to the federal 
common law of tribal immunity from suit.”122 The Tribe’s motion 
was heard by the superior court in early 2003. 
 115. Agua Caliente, 2003 WL 733094, at *7. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See supra note 14; see also Don Thompson, California Rulings Cut Both Ways in 
Tribal Election Law Cases, S.F. CHRON., July 23, 2003, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/07/23/state2055EDT0220.DTL. 
 118. No. 02AS04544, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2003), http://www.fppc.ca.gov/ 
pdf/Santa%20Rosa%20Quash%20Ruling.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). 
 119. The Santa Rosa Tribe’s boundaries encompass approximately 170 acres in the San 
Joaquin Valley. The Tribe was established in 1934 and has over 200 members. See The Tachi 
Yokut Tribe: The Santa Rosa Rancheria, http://www.tachi-yokut.com/rancheria.html (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2004). 
 120. First Amended Complaint of the FPPC ¶¶ 9–10, Santa Rosa Cmty. (No. 
02AS04544), at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/SantaRosaFAC.pdf (last visited May 26, 
2004). 
 121. Id. ¶¶ 13–23. 
 122. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op. at 2. 
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2. The case against removing tribal immunity under the PRA 
In March of 2003, a superior court judge ruled that, in contrast 
with the ruling in Agua Caliente, the Santa Rosa Tribe was immune 
from any suit brought under the Political Reform Act.123 Instead of 
focusing on whether the State’s interest in protecting its political 
processes outweighs the Tribe’s interest in tribal immunity from suit, 
the court focused exclusively on the doctrine of waiver. Like the 
court in Agua Caliente, the court refused to recognize the Tribe’s 
participation in the State’s political processes as an express waiver of 
tribal immunity.124
With respect to congressional waiver, the court reaffirmed the 
Supreme Court’s position in Kiowa that any congressional waiver 
must be explicit.125 As a corollary, the court reasoned, 
[C]ongressional silence regarding the immunity of Indian tribes 
from suits to enforce state law requirements for electoral campaign 
contributions cannot be construed as congressional 
acknowledgment of the States’ right to bring such suits against the 
tribes in the exercise of the States’ powers under the Tenth 
Amendment and the Guaranty [sic] Clause of the United States 
Constitution.126
The court concluded that tribal immunity from suit is available 
to tribes even in situations in which rights granted to a state might 
be minimized, unless Congress expressly abrogates the immunity.127 
According to the court, “Congress . . . may exercise its plenary 
power over Indian affairs to approve, either by express enactment or 
by silence, common law tribal immunity from suits by the States . . . 
even though the immunity may hamper the States’ exercise of its 
reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment.”128
 123. Id. at 12. 
 124. Id. at 11. 
 125. Id. at 9. 
 126. Id. at 9–10. 
 127. Id. at 10 (“Congress does not impermissibly intrude upon the States’ reserved 
powers under the Tenth Amendment and Guaranty [sic] Clause when, by silence, it permits 
the doctrine of common law tribal immunity from suit to bar suits by the States to enforce 
against tribes state reporting requirements for electoral campaign contributions.”). 
 128. Id. at 10–11 (footnote omitted). The court’s conclusion is based primarily in the 
Constitution:  
  Congress has plenary power to control and define the sovereign activities and 
interests of Indian tribes under article 1, section 8, clause 3, of the United States 
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In reaching its conclusion, the court was “not unmindful” of the 
State’s interest in protecting its political processes.129 Rather, the 
court recognized that California has a fundamental interest in 
protecting the State’s political processes and that the PRA serves as 
an effective means of protecting those interests.130 In spite of these 
concessions, however, the court concluded that it must recognize 
the immunity from suit traditionally granted to tribes. 
IV. A STATE’S INTEREST IN ITS ELECTORAL PROCESSES IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO ABROGATE TRIBAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT 
The court in Santa Rosa reached the correct result. Tribal 
immunity protects tribes from suit under the Political Reform Act. 
Agua Caliente incorrectly focused on a preemption analysis, which is 
appropriate only when deciding whether a state is authorized to 
regulate individual activity, and not when deciding whether a state 
has the right to enforce a regulation against a tribe or its members. 
Further, the Tenth Amendment and Guarantee Clause of the United 
States Constitution do not act as an explicit waiver of tribal 
immunity and, therefore, are not grounds for abrogating immunity. 
Finally, recognizing tribal immunity from suit does not lead to an 
undesirable result because recipients of campaign donations must 
also file disclosure statements that identify donors, including tribal 
donors. 
A. The Court Reached the Wrong Conclusion in Agua Caliente by 
Incorrectly Relying on a Preemption Analysis to Abrogate Tribal 
Immunity from Suit 
The court in Agua Caliente concluded that tribal immunity did 
not protect the Tribe from suit under the Political Reform Act 
because no case has applied the doctrine of tribal immunity to 
instances in which tribal conduct is designed to influence a state’s 
political processes rather than promoting self-government.131 This 
Constitution. . . . As a result, the States have jurisdiction over tribal activities only as 
permitted by federal law even when the tribal activities affect state sovereign powers, 
rights, and interests.  
Id. at 10 (citations omitted). 
 129. Id. at 12. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No. 
02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003), aff’d, Agua Caliente 
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reasoning suggests a balancing of interests by the court and a belief 
that states may properly regulate tribes when tribes are acting to 
influence a sovereign’s political processes. While this assertion may 
be correct, it incorrectly focuses the question on regulation rather 
than enforcement. 
The test for determining when states are authorized to regulate 
tribal conduct on Indian land132 is different from the test used to 
determine when tribal immunity from suit may be abrogated to 
allow states to enforce their regulations in state court.133 In 
determining those situations in which states are authorized to 
regulate tribal conduct on Indian land, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that tribal sovereignty must “take account of the State’s 
legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non-Indians.”134 
Courts, therefore, engage in balancing the competing interests of 
tribes in promoting self-government against state interests in 
regulating conduct within its borders to determine those situations 
in which states are entitled to regulate non-Indians on reservations. 
This balancing of interests, however, does not answer the question of 
whether tribes are immune from suit. 
Rather than addressing the question of whether the state has 
authority to enforce tribal violations of the PRA, the court in Agua 
Caliente focused on the issue of whether the state has authority to 
regulate tribal campaign contributions.135 Under the Supreme 
Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Ct. App. 2004), available 
at 2004 WL 389462. 
 132. See supra notes 50–61 and accompanying text. 
 133. See supra notes 62–80 and accompanying text. 
 134. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973); see also 
supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
 135. The distinction between the authority to regulate and the ability to enforce 
regulations through a lawsuit is not merely a distinction without a difference. In Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, the Supreme Court concluded that 
Oklahoma was authorized to tax cigarette sales by the Tribe to nonmembers. 498 U.S. 505, 
513 (1991). However, in addition to deciding that the State was authorized to regulate these 
cigarette sales, the Court also concluded that tribal immunity from suit prevented the state 
from bringing enforcement actions in court to collect the taxes. Id. at 509–11. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court admits that “[t]here is no doubt that sovereign immunity bars the State 
from pursuing the most efficient remedy.” Id. at 514. The Court suggests, however, that the 
State is not without a remedy. The State could, for example, “collect the sales tax from 
cigarette wholesalers, either by seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation, or by assessing 
wholesalers who supplied unstamped cigarettes to the tribal stores.” Id. (citations omitted). 
For further examples of the distinction between regulation and enforcement, see Washington v. 
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Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo, which concluded that states 
have a significant interest in protecting their political processes and 
ensuring that wealthy contributions do not influence political 
candidates, it is possible that California has authority to regulate 
tribal contributions from tribes intended to influence the state’s 
political processes.136
But no matter how large the state interest, the question of tribal 
immunity has traditionally been one of waiver.137 While the court in 
Agua Caliente was correct that “[n]o case has held that a tribe is 
immune from suit for activities that, instead of promoting tribal self-
governance and development, are intended to influence a sovereign 
State’s electoral and legislative processes,”138 it is also correct that no 
court case (prior to Agua Caliente) has abrogated tribal immunity 
on the basis that a state has a significant interest in enforcing its 
regulations. Rather, as the court in Santa Rosa correctly noted, “the 
issue is resolved by federal case law recognizing tribal immunity from 
suits arising from particular tribal activities whenever Congress has 
not expressly abrogated the immunity or the tribe has not expressly 
waived its immunity from suit with respect to those activities.”139
Tribal immunity cannot be abrogated by invoking a compelling 
governmental interest; it can only be abrogated by express 
Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), and Moe v. Confederated 
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
 136. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). While Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
U.S. 145 (1973), suggests that the question of whether tribes themselves may be regulated 
depends on whether the activity occurred within or without Indian country, the fact that tribal 
conduct may have an impact beyond the reservation does not necessarily mean that the state 
can regulate it if the conduct actually occurred on the reservation. Thus, the question of 
whether California has the authority to regulate a tribe depends largely on where the tribe’s 
conduct occurred, not on the place of its impact. 
 137. See Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op. 
at 9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2003), http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/Santa%20Rosa%20 
Quash%20Ruling.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). (“Were the preemption analysis to result in 
a determination authorizing state regulation of tribal contributions, the determination would 
not resolve the critical issue here: whether a state suit against a tribe to enforce a state electoral 
campaign regulations [sic], even if validly imposed upon the tribe, would be barred by the 
federal common law doctrine of tribal immunity.”). 
 138. Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No. 
02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003), aff’d, Agua Caliente 
Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Ct. App. 2004), available 
at 2004 WL 389462. 
 139. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op. at 9. 
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congressional actions or waived by express tribal actions.140 While 
requiring express waiver may serve as an “unjustifiable impediment[] 
to the State’s achievement of its sovereign interest in the integrity of 
its electoral processes . . . [,] [a]ny perceived inequity resulting from 
the application of tribal immunity to bar this action must be 
accepted.”141 The Supreme Court has been unwilling to provide 
exceptions to its waiver requirements, choosing instead to leave 
competing policy concerns in the hands of Congress.142 Until 
Congress chooses to abrogate this immunity or until tribes provide 
express waiver of their immunity, courts should not engage in a 
balancing of competing interests to determine when tribal immunity 
from suit may be abrogated. 
B. Neither the Tenth Amendment nor the Guarantee Clause  
Constitute an Express Waiver 
The court in Agua Caliente also relied on the rights guaranteed 
to states by the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause of the 
Constitution in concluding that tribes are not immune from suit 
brought under the PRA.143 While the Tenth Amendment reserves to 
a state the power to regulate its legislative processes,144 and the 
Guarantee Clause grants to every state the right to a republican form 
of government,145 neither, as the court correctly noted in Santa 
Rosa, serves as an explicit waiver of tribal immunity from suit. 
The FPPC argued, and the Agua Caliente court agreed, that 
“[w]ere the Tribe immune under federal law from judicial relief for 
violations of the PRA requirements, the State’s exercise of its 
 140. See supra Part II.B.  
 141. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op. at 12; see also Three Affiliated Tribes of 
Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, Inc., 476 U.S. 877, 893 (1986) (“The perceived 
inequity of permitting the Tribe to recover from a non-Indian for civil wrongs in instances 
where a non-Indian allegedly may not recover against the Tribe simply must be accepted in 
view of the overriding federal and tribal interests . . . , much in the same way that the perceived 
inequity of permitting the United States or [a state] to sue in cases where they could not be 
sued as defendants because of their sovereign immunity also must be accepted.”). 
 142. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998). 
 143. Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No. 
02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003), aff’d, Agua Caliente 
Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Ct. App. 2004), available 
at 2004 WL 389462. 
 144. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 145. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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reserved power to regulate and preserve the integrity of its electoral  
. . . processes would be seriously compromised.”146 Indeed, were 
immunity available to tribes for violating state campaign disclosure 
laws, states would lose the right to control completely their electoral 
processes. If such were the case, tribes would be allowed to make 
campaign contributions as they saw fit without having to report such 
contributions. Under the Supreme Court’s Buckley analysis, failure to 
make tribes comply with these disclosure requirements would 
potentially interfere with a state’s interest to inform its voters and 
ensure the integrity of its electoral processes.147
But while an inability to compel compliance with state campaign 
disclosure requirements might interfere with a state’s compelling 
interest, that interference does not remove a tribe’s immunity under 
the Supreme Court’s requirement that removal of immunity must be 
explicit.148 No court has identified the Tenth Amendment or the 
Guarantee Clause as an explicit waiver of tribal immunity. Tribal 
immunity from suit has its roots in the Constitution, which grants to 
Congress “plenary power to control and define the sovereign 
activities and interests of Indian tribes.”149 Congress has exercised 
this plenary power to grant to tribes a general immunity from suits 
by states. Consequently, “[s]tates have jurisdiction over tribal 
activities only as permitted by federal law even when tribal activities 
affect state sovereign powers, rights, and interest.”150 While this 
immunity may conflict with powers vested in states by the Tenth 
Amendment and the Guarantee Clause, “the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution permits Congress to legislate even in 
areas traditionally regulated by the States as long as it is acting within 
the powers granted it under the Constitution.”151 Consequently, 
some of the powers granted to the states by the Constitution may be 
 146. Agua Caliente, 2003 WL 733094, at *5, *7.  
 147. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 148. For an example of explicit waiver of tribal immunity by Congress, see Indian Tribal 
Economic Development and Contracts Encouragement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-79 
(2000), and Tribal Tort Claims and Risk Management Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 105-277 
(2000). 
 149. See Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op. 
at 10 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2003), http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/Santa%20Rosa%20 
Quash%20Ruling.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2004) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). 
 150. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877 
(1986), and California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)). 
 151. Id. at 11 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)). 
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diminished by congressional action. It is clear from the Court’s 
recent recognition of tribal immunity that it does not see the Tenth 
Amendment as providing explicit waiver of tribal immunity in suits 
between tribes and states.152
As a result, neither the Tenth Amendment nor the Guarantee 
Clause serves as an exception to the general requirements of tribal 
immunity from suit. Instead, an acknowledgement of tribal 
immunity in cases brought under the PRA does not “impermissibly 
intrude upon the States’ reserved powers under the Tenth 
Amendment and Guaranty [sic] Clause.”153 While neither includes an 
explicit exception for tribal immunity from a state’s reserved powers, 
this silence cannot serve as “congressional acknowledgment of the 
States’ right to bring such suits against the tribes in the exercise of 
the States’ powers under the Tenth Amendment and the Guaranty 
[sic] Clause of the United States Constitution.”154 Because of the 
time and resources which would be required for Congress to 
explicitly identify every situation in which tribal immunity is 
applicable, such a requirement for determining whether tribal 
immunity is available would be unreasonable. Because of these 
congressional limitations, the Supreme Court’s requirement that 
immunity be abrogated only upon express waiver is a more 
appropriate standard for determining when states may bring suit 
against tribes. 
C. Immunity Does Not Prevent the Disclosure of Tribal Contributions 
While removal of tribal immunity is unfounded when the FPPC 
is trying to enforce disclosure requirements against Indian tribes, 
such removal does not destroy the purpose of the Act, which is to 
provide California voters with a clear picture of a candidate’s 
financial supporters.155
In addition to requiring that donor committees report 
contributions made to political candidates, the Act also requires that 
candidates or other recipients of tribal contributions report the 
contribution.156 Under section 84211 of the Act, candidates and 
 152. See generally Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998). 
 153. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op. at 10. 
 154. Id. 
 155. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81001(b) (2003). 
 156. Id. § 84211. 
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others who receive contributions must report “[t]he total amount of 
contributions received during the period covered by the campaign 
statement and the total cumulative amount of contributions 
received.”157 In addition to disclosing the amounts of any 
contribution, the Act requires that the candidate disclose the donor’s 
name, address, and occupation.158 The Act makes no explicit 
exception for donations by Indian tribes.159
Thus, while the tribe is immune from prosecution to enforce the 
requirements of the Political Reform Act, disclosure of the extent of 
tribal influence on political candidates and processes is made 
available through mandatory disclosure requirements enforceable 
against candidates. The dual reporting requirements imposed upon 
both donor and donee achieve the same result, though in a different 
manner, as if the tribe were not immune from suit and were 
responsible for complying with the state’s reporting requirements.160
If the purpose of the PRA is to ensure that voters are not misled 
in the election process by the hidden interests of a candidate or the 
invisible supporters of legislation, the source of the disclosure, 
 157. Id. § 84211(a). 
 158. Id. § 84211(f). 
 159. While the Act includes no specific requirement that tribes disclose the recipient(s) of 
their donations and while acts by the State to enforce the disclosure requirements would, as 
this Comment suggests, violate the notions of tribal immunity, the Agua Caliente Tribe has 
“extended [a] courtes[y] to the State of California and disclosed the recipients of campaign 
donations for the year 2002.” FPPC & Lobbyist Reports, at 
http://www.aguacaliente.org/reports.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). These disclosures were 
made in compliance with the Act’s requirements and were made on the State’s reporting 
forms. These disclosures are available on the Tribe’s website. See id. 
 160. This result assumes, of course, that candidates will be truthful in their disclosures. 
The potential for candidate dishonesty in reporting campaign contributions increases when 
supporters are not required to report their contributions. One purpose of the dual reporting 
system is to remove enticements for candidate dishonesty. But as the potential for dishonesty 
increases, the likelihood of such dishonesty does not also necessarily increase. In deciding 
whether to be truthful in their reporting of campaign contributions, candidates must weigh 
any added benefits received from failing to disclose campaign contributors against the potential 
costs associated with a future revelation of their dishonesty. Because of the potentially high 
costs associated with a candidate who is thought to have deceived voters, it is likely that this 
cost-benefit analysis will result in candidates providing full disclosure of their campaign 
supporters. 
Further, while a removal of the requirement that supporters report their campaign 
donations may increase the likelihood of collusion between candidates and supporters, it 
should be noted that the dual reporting system allows for collusion between parties as well. 
Candidates and supporters could decide to mutually ignore the reporting requirements under 
the dual reporting system as they can when only the candidate is required to report 
contributions. 
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whether tribe or candidate, is irrelevant. That the tribes themselves 
are not required to provide disclosures does not destroy these 
purposes; the dual disclosure requirements provide that all financial 
contributors to a candidate’s campaign are disclosed by the 
candidate.161
With respect to tribal contributions, the real effect of tribal 
immunity from enforcement of the Political Reform Act is that a 
snapshot of all tribal contributions will only be available if the tribe 
chooses to voluntarily comply with the state disclosure requirements. 
Without this snapshot, voters will be required to look at individual 
disclosure requirements to determine which candidates and which 
causes individual tribes support. But because the information is 
available, albeit in a less manageable form through candidate 
disclosures, the purposes of the Act are still satisfied. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Protecting a state’s interests in its own political processes by 
requiring individuals and organizations who donate to political 
candidates or causes to disclose their donations (rightfully) has been 
held to be an important governmental interest. The right to regulate 
these processes is entrusted to the states through the Constitution. 
This authority to regulate may serve as a limit to traditional notions 
of tribal sovereignty that the Supreme Court has recognized as 
inhering in Indian tribes. 
But while states may have compelling interests in protecting their 
political processes, and while those interests may preempt tribal 
sovereignty and allow states to regulate tribal contributions, those 
interests do not allow states to enforce the regulations in state court. 
The doctrine of tribal immunity provides Indian tribes with a general 
shield against prosecution in state or federal court. This immunity is 
removed only when it is expressly waived either by Congress or the 
tribes. As the court in Santa Rosa correctly held, neither a state’s 
compelling interests in protecting its political processes nor the 
Tenth Amendment nor the Guarantee Clause serve as an express 
waiver of tribal immunity for cases brought under the PRA.162
The policies of the Act, however, are not frustrated by 
recognizing tribal immunity. Because the state requires recipients of 
 161. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84211(a)(2003). 
 162. See supra Part III.B.  
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campaign contributions to disclose the names of donors and the 
amounts of any donations made, any influence that tribes may 
attempt to exert on California’s political processes will be 
disclosed.163 Thus a tribe’s interests in avoiding suit and the state’s 
interest in protecting its processes are both protected by recognizing 
tribal immunity under the Political Reform Act. 
Cameron A. Reese
 163. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84211(a). 
